Spotlight on construction cost overrun research: superficial, replicative and stagnated. by Ahiaga-Dagbui, Dominic et al.
 
 
 
 
OpenAIR@RGU 
 
The Open Access Institutional Repository 
at Robert Gordon University 
 
http://openair.rgu.ac.uk 
 
This is an author produced version of a paper published in  
 
Proceedings of the 31st Annual ARCOM Conference (ISBN 
9780955239090) 
 
This version may not include final proof corrections and does not include 
published layout or pagination. 
 
 
Citation Details 
 
Citation for the version of the work held in ‘OpenAIR@RGU’: 
 
AHIAGA-DAGBUI, D. D., SMITH, S. D., LOVE, P. E. D. and 
ACKERMAN, F., 2015. Spotlight on construction cost overrun 
research: superficial, replicative and stagnated. Available from 
OpenAIR@RGU. [online]. Available from: http://openair.rgu.ac.uk 
 
 
Citation for the publisher’s version: 
 
AHIAGA-DAGBUI, D. D., SMITH, S. D., LOVE, P. E. D. and 
ACKERMAN, F., 2015. Spotlight on construction cost overrun 
research: superficial, replicative and stagnated.In: A. RAIDEN and 
ABOAGYE-NIMO, E., eds. Proceedings of the 31st Annual ARCOM 
Conference. 7-9 September 2015. Lincoln: Association of 
Researchers in Construction Management. Pp. 863-872. 
 
 
 
Copyright 
Items in ‘OpenAIR@RGU’, Robert Gordon University Open Access Institutional Repository, 
are protected by copyright and intellectual property law. If you believe that any material 
held in ‘OpenAIR@RGU’ infringes copyright, please contact openair-help@rgu.ac.uk with 
details. The item will be removed from the repository while the claim is investigated. 
  
 
 
 
 
SPOTLIGHT ON CONSTRUCTION COST OVERRUN 
RESEARCH: SUPERFICIAL, REPLICATIVE AND 
STAGNATED 
 
Dominic D Ahiaga-Dagbui
1,1
, Simon D Smith
2
, Peter E.D Love
3
, Fran 
Ackermann
4 
 
1 
Scott Sutherland School of Architecture and Built Environment, Robert Gordon University, 
Aberdeen, AB10 7QB, Scotland, United Kingdom 
2 
School of Engineering, The University of Edinburgh, William Rankine Building, Edinburgh, 
EH9 3JL, Scotland, United Kingdom 
3
Department of Civil Engineering, Curtin University, GPO Box U1987, Perth, WA 6845, 
Australia 
4
School of Management, Curtin University, GPO Box U1987, Perth, WA 6845, Australia 
 
                                                 
1
 Corresponding author: d.d.ahiaga-dagbui@rgu.ac.uk 
 
2015 
 
 
 
 
 
AUTHOR’S COPY – 
 
 
Ahiaga-Dagbui DD, Smith SD, Love PED, Ackermann F (2015) Spotlight on 
construction cost overrun research: superficial, replicative and Stagnated, In: Procs 
31
st
 Annual ARCOM Conference, Raiden A and Aboagye-Nimo E (Eds), 
Association of Researchers in Construction Management 7-9
th
 Sept, 2015 Lincoln, 
UK. 
 
SPOTLIGHT ON CONSTRUCTION COST OVERRUN 
RESEARCH: SUPERFICIAL, REPLICATIVE AND 
STAGNATED 
Dominic D Ahiaga-Dagbui
1,2
, Simon D Smith
2
, Peter E.D Love
3
, Fran 
Ackermann
4
 
1 
Scott Sutherland School of Architecture and Built Environment, Robert Gordon University, 
Aberdeen, AB10 7QB, Scotland, United Kingdom 
2 
School of Engineering, The University of Edinburgh, William Rankine Building, Edinburgh, EH9 
3JL, Scotland, United Kingdom 
3
Department of Civil Engineering, Curtin University, GPO Box U1987, Perth, WA 6845, Australia 
4
School of Management, Curtin University, GPO Box U1987, Perth, WA 6845, Australia 
Construction projects routinely overrun their cost estimates. A plethora of studies have 
thus been dedicated to investigating the root causes, sizes, distribution and nature of 
overruns. The causes range from a poor understanding of the impact of systemicity 
and complexity of projects, unrealistic cost targets, misguided trade-offs between 
project scope, time and cost, to suspicions of foul-play and even corruption. In spite of 
the vast attention dedicated to the problem of cost overrun, there has been limited 
evidence to support a claim that the size or occurrence of cost overruns is reducing in 
practice. A review of the literature reveals that it may not be an exaggeration to claim 
that the bulk of our current cost overrun research may largely be inadequate and 
deficient to deal with the complexity posed by construction projects. This paper 
provides a critique of current cost overrun research and suggests that the adoption of 
systems thinking is required to better understand the nature of cost overruns. We 
explore some of the embedded methodological weaknesses in the approaches adopted 
in a majority of cost overrun research, particularly the lack of systems thinking and 
demonstrable causality. We reach the following conclusion - cost overrun research has 
largely stagnated in the refinement and advancement of the knowledge area. It has 
largely been superficial and replicative. A significant paradigm and methodological 
shift may be required to address this perennial and complex problem faced in 
construction project delivery. 
Keywords: causality, cost overruns, cost control, project performance, 
replication, research method, systems thinking. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cost estimates prepared in the early stages of a project allow a client to evaluate 
most economical tenders, secure funding or perform a cost-benefit analysis. These 
estimates also often become the basis for cost control during project delivery. 
Where the project is a commercial asset, the initial capital investment to deliver 
the project must be balanced with the cost of maintenance and operations over the 
life-time of the project to ensure it remains profitable and that planned returns on 
investment are achievable. Thus, decisions made during the formative stages of a 
project carry far-reaching economic consequences and can seal the financial fate 
of a project. Effective cost planning, therefore, relates design of buildings to their 
cost, so that while taking full account of quality, risks, likely scope changes, 
utility and appearance, the cost of a project is planned to be within the economic 
limit of expenditure. 
Unfortunately, construction projects regularly still make the news headlines, not 
for being remarkable engineering accomplishments that will support and 
stimulate economic growth and social integration of communities, but rather for 
being poorly managed and often over budget. A significant number of 
construction projects routinely overrun their cost estimates. According to the 
works of Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), infrastructure projects are reported to have an 
86% probability of outrunning their set cost targets. The average size of these 
overruns can be as high as 45% for rail projects, 34% for bridges and 20% for 
road projects. Love et al (2012) and Odeck (2004) on the other hand found that 
overruns could be as high as 70% and 183% more than the initial estimate 
respectively. The global audit and professional services firm, Ernst and Young, 
reviewed the performance of 365 infrastructure projects delivered in the oil and 
gas industry and found that at least 64% of the projects were faced cost overruns 
to varying degrees. The projects recorded an average cost overrun of 59%, 
representing an incremental cost of US$500 billion in real terms (Ernst and 
Young 2014). Merrow (2012) also found that up to 78% of oil and gas projects 
face significant cost overruns at an average of 33%.  
Cost overrun has been attributed to several sources including scope creep and 
rework (Love et al. 2005), unrealistic cost targets and misguided trade-offs 
between project scope, time and cost (Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith 2014b), a poor 
understanding of the systemic and dynamic nature of projects (Eden et al. 2005), 
unidentified or improperly managed risk and uncertainty (Okmen and Öztas 
2010) to suspicions of foul-play and corruption (Wachs 1990). 
A review of the construction management literature, however, reveals that a 
plethora of studies have been dedicated to understanding the problem of cost 
overruns (Morris 1990, Flyvbjerg et al. 2004, Odeck 2004, Ahiaga-Dagbui and 
Smith 2013, 2014a, Love et al. 2015). Most of these studies usually identify 
several purported causes of overruns and often make recommendations for 
mitigating and containing the phenomenon. However, there seems to be no 
evidence of alleviating the problem or improving the reliability of cost estimates 
for construction projects. The industry may have earned itself the unenviable 
repute of delivering projects late and over budget, again and again, leaving clients 
dissatisfied and the tax-payer often out of pocket. 
So, why are cost overruns so prevalent in the construction industry irrespective of 
the attention it gets both in academia and practices? Why has there not been much 
improvement in the reliability of initial cost estimates over the years? Surely the 
industry has become a lot better at managing projects. Procurement systems have 
greatly evolved from traditional adversarial design-bid-build to different forms of 
collaborative and relationship contracts. There are more measures now for 
accountability and cost control for project procurement. Information technology 
for construction has also improved significantly with the advent of Computer 
Aided Designs (CAD) and Building Information Modelling (BIM). There are now 
online collaborative platforms for effective communication, design, visualisation, 
simulation, control and coordination of the entire construction process. There 
appears to be growing take-up of digital 3D design and even 4D models that 
integrate the spatial and temporal aspects of a project to understand, predict, 
evaluate and manage even the most complex projects. Most of these IT systems 
support project cost estimation as well as allow for the use of estimation software 
and advanced costing methods like feature-based estimation, genetic algorithms 
or fuzzy logic. 
It is against this backdrop, this paper provides a critique of current cost overrun 
research and a nudge towards adoption of systems thinking in dealing with 
construction cost overruns. The paper will explore some of the embedded 
methodological weaknesses in the approaches adopted in a majority of cost 
overrun research, particularly the lack of systems thinking and demonstrable 
causality as well as the over-simplification of the cost overrun problem and 
replication. The paper concludes with some recommendations regarding the 
future direction of cost overrun research and mitigation.   
COST OVERRUN RESEARCH: SIMPLISTIC, SUPERFICIAL 
AND REPLICATIVE 
As already alluded to, there is no shortage of research dedicated to understanding 
the problem of cost overruns or making recommendations on how to alleviate this 
perennial problem in the construction industry. On the whole, this is 
commendable and should be further encouraged. However, there seems to be no 
evidence of real improvements in the reliability of initial cost estimates or the 
predictability of final cost, even with the use of new technologies available to 
construction experts. A critical review of the literature however quickly reveals 
that it may not be an exaggeration to claim that the bulk of our current research 
may be largely inadequate and deficient to deal with the complexity of 
construction cost overruns. Worryingly, it would seem that most studies are rather 
simplistic and superficial, replicative and not been cumulative enough to be 
effective in addressing the problem. On close scrutiny also, there would seem to 
be stagnation in the rigour and thoroughness of cost overrun research.  
Memon et al (2012) undertook an investigation into the 'causes' of cost overrun in 
large construction projects in Malaysia. Using the extant literature, they first 
identified 35 different factors that could lead to cost overrun and then required of 
clients, consultants and contractors to rank these factors on a five-point Likert 
scale from 'not significant' to 'extremely significant'. These factors include 'poor 
project management', 'lack of coordination between parties', 'mistakes during 
construction' and 'slow information flow between parties'. A relative importance 
index, defined in equation 1, was then used to weight these factors. The strength 
of correlation between the various factors was also measured using the 
Spearman's rank correlation, ρ, to add some statistical rigour to the study. 
Relative Importance Index =  
∑ w.x51
A .N
        ------- Equation 1 
Where 
w = weighting given to each factor by respondents 
x = frequency of response given for each cause  
A = highest weight (i.e. 5 in this case)  
N = total number of participants  
 
Out of the 150 questionnaires distributed, 103 were returned with 97 valid. 
Fluctuation in prices of materials, contractor cashflow problems and client 
payment delay were the top three 'causes' of overrun. Respondents were also 
required to recall the approximate extent of cost overrun (cost beyond contract 
sum) for the projects they were involved with within the past ten years. A 
majority (61%) of the respondents reported a range of 5% to 10% of contract 
sum. About 20% recalled overruns beyond 20% of contract sum.  
This approach to cost overrun research is not untypical at all- Kaming et al 
(1997), Ameh et al. (2010), Mansfield et al. (1994), Jackson (2002), Enshassi et 
al. (2010), Durdyev  et al. (2012), Rosenfeld (2014) and many others have all 
conducted almost identical studies. A careful scrutiny of most of the studies 
aforementioned, reveal some common pathologies in much of cost overrun 
research: 
1. Lack of systems thinking  
This is perhaps the most common shortcoming in the methodological 
approach adopted in cost overrun research. Most studies identify single 
points in a causal chain where an intervention may have reasonably been 
implemented to change performance and prevent an undesirable outcome. 
This includes past research by some of the authors of this current paper 
(Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith 2012) as well as studies by Odeck (2004), 
Durdyev et al (2012), Flyvbjerg et al (2004) and Mansfield et al. (1994). 
The identification of singular causes, which in most cases only describe the 
proximal causes, is counterproductive, as overrun causation can only be 
understood by looking at the whole project system in which it occurs and 
how variables dynamically interact with one another. Problems very seldom 
occur as stand-alone issues. Even though they may superficially appear to 
be different, sources of poor performance on construction projects are very 
much interrelated, sometimes in rather complex ways. The crucial skill in 
understanding cost overrun is not the ability to list or rank factors but the 
capacity to see connections and the dynamics between the various sources. 
Hamilton  (1997) outlines two important properties of systems thinking that 
would be useful in cost overrun research - every part of a system has 
properties that it loses when separated from the system and every system 
has some essential properties that none of its parts do. Thus, when a system 
is taken apart, it loses its essential properties (Von Bertalanffy 1956). 
 
Singular cause identification approach is perhaps based on a faulty 
understanding of the nature of construction projects in general. As 
suggested by Rodrigues and Bowers (1996), traditional approaches to 
investigating project management related problems usually assume that if 
each element of the project can be understood, then the whole project may 
be controlled and delivered effectively. Of course, this approach has yet to 
help project managers deliver their projects on budget and agreed 
timescales. It is important to therefore to adopt a systemic, or causal loop 
approaches when investigating complex problems like cost overruns 
particularly in large public projects. Boateng et al (2013) and Ackermann et 
al (2007) have both applied this systemic approach for identification and 
modelling risk in project delivery.  
2. Illusion of causality - correlation does not mean causality 
A significant number of cost overrun research set out to identify the so-
called 'root causes' of the problem but invariably only end up scratching the 
surface of this complicated problem. Finding strong correlations between 
factors does not mean the factors are causes of the phenomenon under 
study. For example, the fact that high 'graffiti' (Skogan 1990) and 'broken 
window' neighbourhoods (Wilson and Kellig 1982)  correlate rather 
strongly with high crime levels does not mean that graffiti or broken 
windows cause the crimes. The next example borders on the absurd, but 
aptly sustains the argument being developed. Since 1883, eight Pontiffs 
have died, five in Grand Slam years of the Six Nations rugby tournament. 
This led to the conclusion that "every time Wales win the rugby grand slam, 
a Pope dies, except for 1978 when Wales were really good, and two Popes 
died" (Payne et al. 2008). [Note: the authors of the Pope study did not 
intend the findings to be taken seriously, but it supports point nonetheless. 
There was no Papal death the last time Wales won in 2008 anyway].  
Just because two things strongly correlate does not necessarily mean that 
one causes the other. This would seem readily obvious, but can be easily 
overlooked. A correlation provides circumstantial evidence implying a 
causal link, but the weight of the evidence depends greatly on the particular 
circumstances involved. Ubani et al  (2013) set out to investigate factors that 
cause cost and schedule overruns in Nigeria. They developed a 
questionnaire based on "110 hypothetical cost overrun" factors identified 
from the literature. The returned questionnaires from respondents were then 
analysed by measuring relative importance and correlation coefficients. 
They found that material related issues, including price fluctuation and 
shortages were the main causes of overrun. They rejected the hypothesis 
that contractual relationships, labour and design had any significant 
influence on cost overrun. They then recommended that clients, contractors 
and consultants "should pay more attention to both material and external 
factors for there to be effective and efficient delivery on construction 
projects at the right time and cost." It is readily obvious the lack of 
demonstration of causation between the factors identified or the 
superficially of their approach and recommendation. The reader is invited to 
take a closer look at the formulation of the following studies to see if 
causation has been sufficiently demonstrated to warrant the paper titles: 
"Significant factors causing cost overruns in telecommunication projects in 
Nigeria" (Ameh et al. 2010); "Causes of construction cost and time 
overruns: The 2010 FIFA World Cup stadia in South Africa"(Baloyi and 
Bekker 2011); "What causes cost overrun in transport infrastructure 
projects?" (Flyvbjerg et al. 2004) and "Causes of delay and cost overruns in 
Nigerian construction projects" (Mansfield et al. 1994).   
3. Ambiguous and Superficial Factors 
Poor project management, lack of coordination between parties, mistakes 
during construction and slow information flow between parties are some of 
the factors used in the survey by Memon et al (2012). Others like 
inadequate control procedures, slow decision making, waiting for 
information or poor documentation used in Frimpong et al (2003) are rather 
too ambiguous. They could be easily be misinterpreted by the respondents 
especially if they are all not thinking within the context of a particular 
project or situation. The reader is invited to pause for a moment here and 
think through the factors "poor project management" and "poor 
documentation". It is very likely that several interpretations, scenarios or 
examples came to mind in that exercise. This may be a quick indication that 
such factors are rather too superficial and therefore must be broken down 
further if real sources of overrun are to be identified. Questionnaires may be 
a quick and easy way of sampling the views of respondents but can also be 
problematical if the researcher’s definition of a factor does not correspond 
with the respondent’s understanding.  
Unless they were perhaps used in a structured case study, for example, it is 
argued that questionnaires alone may not be suitable for investigating 
complex and systemic problems like cost overrun on construction projects. 
Good project management or efficient document management will mean 
very different things to respondents. The factors are simply too high level to 
help in getting to the heart of the problem itself. Interviews allowing the 
surfacing of deep tacit knowledge and also enabling the capture of 
relationships can provide a much more comprehensive and effective 
representation of the situation. 
4. Cross Perspective  
To further complicate matters, respondents are often drawn from different 
professions in the industry. On first thought, this may seem a prudent 
approach as it helps to investigate the problem from different perspectives. 
However, both Durdyev et al (2012) and Memon et al (2012) for example, 
surveyed clients, consultants and contractors without controlling for the 
different perspectives of these professional. It might be agreeable that the 
perceived sources, sizes or nature of overruns will be significantly vary 
depending on whether the construction profession works for a client or the 
contracting firm, or whether they work in the public or private sector. It 
probably may be best to survey these groups separately than merge all their 
responses into one. This problem of context and cross-perspectives could at 
least be partially addressed by using structured case studies as all 
respondents would be reviewing the same project(s). The findings of this 
kind of study would usually be more revealing than a generic questionnaire 
without any context or background. 
 
5. Availability Heuristics  
Heuristics are mental shortcuts that help us make decisions and judgments 
quickly without investing a lot of time analysing information. One such 
heuristic is termed the availability heuristic. According to Gilovich et al 
(2002), availability heuristic is employed when someone estimates the 
frequency or probability of an event based on the ease with which instances 
or associations could be brought to mind. Even though heuristics can be 
extremely helpful, they can easily become a hindrance to deep and careful 
thinking. In their seminal work on heuristics, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1973) posit that availability can often be affected by various factors which 
are completely unrelated to the actual frequency or probability of the event 
under review- how busy the respondent is, their interest in the subject under 
study, level of experience, peculiarities of the most salient examples they 
can recall, their understanding of the questions in the survey or the time 
available to complete a questionnaire. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) thus 
warn that if availability is applied to the analysis of an event, these factors 
"will affect the perceived frequency of the classes and the subjective 
probability of events. Consequently, the use of the availability leads to 
systematic biases".  
 
Without a carefully designed research and established context of projects 
being evaluated, results of the questionnaires, such as the ones conducted in 
(Ameh et al. 2010, Durdyev et al. 2012, Memon et al. 2012) become 
slightly problematic. It is no surprise that the same factors seem to come top 
of the list most of the time in these surveys - poor estimation, poor project 
management, inadequate risk management, unexpected ground conditions, 
scope changes or material price changes. These are the usual suspects and 
they come to mind very readily for respondents. It will take more thoughtful 
research design, perhaps research conducted within the context of a 
particular project, to be able to partly circumvent these default responses 
that have yet to help mitigate or contain cost overrun in construction. 
 
6. Replicative 
Finally, replication, the performance of another study to statistically 
substantiate, or challenge, a hypothesis has significant value for research 
and therefore has been the cornerstone of scientific and social studies. It is 
based on a simple concept: "trust, but verify". Where a replicative study 
results in different findings, it may indicate that the original hypotheses may 
have been incorrect or only partially correct, and that an alternative 
formulation may be able to reconcile apparent divergent results. Replication 
is therefore essential in helping to establish or disprove causal inferences, 
determination of generalisability of findings and even spur on new research. 
When carried out in a cumulative manner, it helps to build on previous 
studies and facilitates a better understanding of a phenomenon. 
 
For cost overrun research, however, replication has largely been a case of 
reinventing the wheel - doing the same thing over and over. Edge (1995) 
aptly describes this sort of research as "the mass production of a standard 
product" lacking in "intellectual expansion" of the field. However, 
expansion in depth and detail of cost overrun research must take priority of 
mere quantity and bulk. Albeit with a slight variation in context, there has 
been little methodological advancement in the studies by Mansfield et al. 
(1994), Kaming et al (1997), Jackson (2002), Ameh et al. (2010), Enshassi 
et al. (2010), Memon et al (2012) and Durdyev  et al. (2012). They mostly 
draw-up a tall list of supposed 'causes' of overruns in a questionnaire and 
require of respondents to rank them using their perceived frequency or 
importance. It comes at little surprise that Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) observed 
in their seminal studies that that the size of overruns have not reduced over 
the 70 years that they studied. They also concluded that "no learning that 
would improve cost estimate accuracy seems to take place." That may well 
be partly due to the stagnation in rigour and robustness of research 
dedicated to ameliorate the problem. In some ways, we might just be where 
we always were, and always will be if there are no significant paradigm and 
methodological shifts in cost overrun research. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
We have explored some of the methodological deficiencies in the approaches 
adopted in a majority of cost overrun research. These include a poor 
understanding of systemicity and embeddedness of the sources of overruns, a lack 
of demonstrable causality and superficiality of the research design. We find that 
cost overrun research has largely stagnated in the refinement and advancement of 
the knowledge area - the bulk of it has largely been replicative. We would 
particularly like to highlight the lack of systems or holistic thinking in cost 
overrun studies, which invariably leads to the identification of single points in a 
causal loop of sources. We argue that this approach is a flawed simplification of 
the cost overrun problem and rather counterproductive. Overrun causation can 
only be understood by looking at the whole project system in which it occurs and 
how several variables dynamically interact with each other. It may be important 
to reiterate here that the crucial skill in understanding cost overrun is not the 
ability to list or rank factors but the capacity to see connections and the dynamics 
between the various sources. It is suggested that significant paradigm and 
methodological shift may be required to properly understand the nature and 
sources of cost overruns. System dynamics or causal loop mapping, used in 
combination with structured-case studies, may be a better approach to 
investigating the cost overrun problem.  
Finally, it may be worth mentioning that this paper was not meant as an attack on 
the works of respectable colleagues but an attempt to look intently at our 
collective efforts and map-out future directions for cost overrun research that 
effectively combines criticality and robustness. This is particularly important and 
timely especially against the backdrop of overwhelming evidence that cost 
overrun is as much a problem today as it has been decades ago. Besides, what is 
the benefit of doing the same thing over and over again if it is not yielding 
transformative results anyway?   
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